Modal logic for other-world agnostics: Neutrality and Halldén incompleteness (Q861518)

The analysis of modal claims by Kripke-type semantics brought about a philosophical discussion on the existence of non-actual possible worlds. An affirmative view by David Lewis is called ``modal realism'', and to the confrontation between modal realism and modal anti-realism John Divers has suggested a neutral standpoint, called ``modal agnosticism'', which accepts Lewis's (literally interpreted) possible worlds semantics while remaining open-minded on his metaphysics. In this paper, the author discusses the question of what modal logic best articulates the modal agnostic position, and shows how the modal logic \(\text{KB4}'\) of elsewhere by Segerberg plays this role. A main issue, among others, is the analysis of the neutral aspect of modal agnosticism by means of Halldén incompleteness of the logic with respect to the disjunction of axioms of modal realism and modal anti-realism.