Private information: Similarity as compatibility (Q868618)

The question about the continuity of economic behavior with respect to variations in the characteristics of the agents is a classic problem in economic theory. Economies with similar agents should generate similar outcomes. The authors consider a differential information economy with a finite number of agents. The private information of each agent is a finite partition of a compact and metrizable space of states of the world. The topology of common information is generated by a function which is defined as the sum of the Boylan distances [see \textit{E.S. Boylan} [Ann. Math. Stat. 42, 552--559 (1971; Zbl 0218.60049)] from each information field to the common information. Such topology allows the authors to establish upper semicontinuity of the Walrasian expectations equilibrium [\textit{R. Radner}, Econometrica 36, 31--58 (1968; Zbl 0167.18601)] and of the private core [\textit{N. C. Yannelis}, Econ. Theory 1, No.~2, 183--197 (1991; Zbl 0810.90013)].