Boolean negation and all that (Q912839)

The author defends a dialethic solution for the semantic paradoxes. Those offering dialethic solutions define a truth predicate within their language, accept the resulting liar contradiction as true, and, of course, base their language on a paraconsistent logic. A rationale for dialethic solutions is that other solutions require conceding that certain ideas, expressible in natural languages, cannot be expressed in a language suitable for science and mathematics. For instance, the standard Tarski metalevels solution renders a single idea of truth inexpressible. A \underbar{tu quoque} rebuttal to dialethicians is that they too, with their paraconsistent logics, render the idea of Boolean negation inexpressible. The author dismisses the rebuttal but characterizing Boolean negation \(\neg\) as: \(\neg A\) is true iff. A is not true, and: \(\neg A\) is false iff. A is not false. Boolean negation differs from DeMorgan negation \(\sim\) which can be characterized as: \(\sim A\) is true iff. A is false, and: \(\sim A\) is false iff. A is true. The author argues that Boolean negation can be expressed in a three- valued paraconsistent logic based on DeMorgan negation without collapsing into the trivial system in which every formula is provable. The gist of his argument is that demands that Boolean negation have all of the features of negation in classical logic begs the crucial question about what properties Boolean negation has beyond those characterized above.