Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle (Q918349)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4158324
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| English | Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4158324 |
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Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle (English)
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1990
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Let X be a set of 3 or more social alternatives and N a set of 2 or more voters. Two results are proved about a social welfare function f on X. If f satisfies nonimposition and independence, and N is finite, then f is either constant or completely dictatorial. If f satisfies nonimposition, independence, and continuity, and N is infinite, then f is again constant or completely dictatorial. The first result is given a new proof; the second is new.
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dictatorship
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Arrow's theorem
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social welfare function
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nonimposition
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independence
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continuity
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0.8365076184272766
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0.8138603568077087
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0.8098618984222412
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0.7995014190673828
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0.7885240316390991
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