Non-Bayesian decision theory. Beliefs and desires as reasons for action. (Q933612)

This book presents an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Throughout its eight chapters, it is mainly concerned with philosophical issues in decision theory. More specifically, the book is concerned with a single well-defined problem in decision theory, the controversy over Bayesianism and non-Bayesianism. Bayesians think that it is enough for rational decision makers to behave as if they maximise their subjective expected utility, whereas non-Bayesians believe one should choose an act over another because its subjective expected utility is optimal. In simple words, the non-Bayesians suggest that the subjective expected utility based on which the rational decision makers make their decisions should not be defined, as Bayesians claim, in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects, but in terms of preferences over certain outcomes. For several decades, Bayesians views have dominated the field, but the author of this book argues that the non-Bayesian approach offers more action guidance to the decision maker. It is the aim of the book, therefore, to challenge the Bayesian approach and to show that there is a viable non-Bayesian alternative. Given its aims, the book is well addressed to all researchers in the field of decision theory, and especially those with philosophical concerns.