Learning to be prepared (Q956581)

Consider a noncooperative game in normal form with a finite set of players. For each player i, define a prep (short for ``preparation'') set as a set of \(i\)'s strategies containing a best reply to the player set \(N - \{i\}\) for any support defined on the overall set of strategies. A minimal prep set is minimal among all prep sets. The paper shows the existence of minimal prep sets. Next, define a best reply dynamics which chooses the most recent best reply, if such best reply exists. The main result of the paper is that for such a game and adjustment process, for memory of sufficient but finite length, then play eventually settles down to a minimal prep set. This result relies heavily on the techniques introduced by \textit{H. P. Young} [Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (1998)].