Key Recycling in Authentication

DOI10.1109/TIT.2014.2317312MaRDI QIDQ2986298zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Christopher Portmann

Publication date 16 May 2017

Published in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.1229

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Abstract: In their seminal work on authentication, Wegman and Carter propose that to authenticate multiple messages, it is sufficient to reuse the same hash function as long as each tag is encrypted with a one-time pad. They argue that because the one-time pad is perfectly hiding, the hash function used remains completely unknown to the adversary. Since their proof is not composable, we revisit it using a composable security framework. It turns out that the above argument is insufficient: if the adversary learns whether a corrupted message was accepted or rejected, information about the hash function is leaked, and after a bounded finite amount of rounds it is completely known. We show however that this leak is very small: Wegman and Carter's protocol is still $epsilon$-secure, if $epsilon$-almost strongly universal${}_2$ hash functions are used. This implies that the secret key corresponding to the choice of hash function can be reused in the next round of authentication without any additional error than this $epsilon$. We also show that if the players have a mild form of synchronization, namely that the receiver knows when a message should be received, the key can be recycled for any arbitrary task, not only new rounds of authentication.

Cited in

(15)

• Key rotation for authenticated encryption
• Implementation of quantum key distribution network simulation module in the network simulator NS-3
• On internal re-keying
• Quantum key distribution using universal hash functions over finite fields
• Quantum and semi-quantum sealed-bid auction: vulnerabilities and advantages
• Key-leakage evaluation of authentication in quantum key distribution with finite resources
• Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication
• Quantum key distribution with PRF(Hash, Nonce) achieves everlasting security
• Distributing secret keys with quantum continuous variables: principle, security and implementations
• Study on the security of the authentication scheme with key recycling in QKD
• Direct proof of security of Wegman-Carter authentication with partially known key
• Quantum authentication with key recycling
• Quantum key distribution scheme with key recycling in integrated optical network
• Secure mutual authentication quantum key agreement scheme for two-party setting with key recycling
• Security without trusted third parties: VRF-based authentication with short authenticated strings

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