Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication

DOI10.1007/S11128-015-1160-4zbMATH Open1333.81124DBLPjournals/qip/PacherALPUZL16arXiv1209.0365OpenAlexW1517334679WikidataQ62114569 ScholiaQ62114569MaRDI QIDQ265393FDOQ265393

Authors: C. Pacher, A. Abidin, T. Lorünser, M. Peev, R. Ursin, Anton Zeilinger, Jan-Åke Larsson 

Publication date: 4 April 2016

Published in: Quantum Information Processing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We demonstrate how adversaries with unbounded computing resources can break Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols which employ a particular message authentication code suggested previously. This authentication code, featuring low key consumption, is not Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) since for each message the eavesdropper has intercepted she is able to send a different message from a set of messages that she can calculate by finding collisions of a cryptographic hash function. However, when this authentication code was introduced it was shown to prevent straightforward Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks against QKD protocols. In this paper, we prove that the set of messages that collide with any given message under this authentication code contains with high probability a message that has small Hamming distance to any other given message. Based on this fact we present extended MITM attacks against different versions of BB84 QKD protocols using the addressed authentication code; for three protocols we describe every single action taken by the adversary. For all protocols the adversary can obtain complete knowledge of the key, and for most protocols her success probability in doing so approaches unity. Since the attacks work against all authentication methods which allow to calculate colliding messages, the underlying building blocks of the presented attacks expose the potential pitfalls arising as a consequence of non-ITS authentication in QKD-postprocessing. We propose countermeasures, increasing the eavesdroppers demand for computational power, and also prove necessary and sufficient conditions for upgrading the discussed authentication code to the ITS level.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.0365

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zbMATH Keywords

collision attacksinformation-theoretic securityman-in-the-middle attackmessage authenticationquantum key distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)

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Cited In (15)

• Attacks on beyond-birthday-bound MACs in the quantum setting
• Quantum key distribution with PRF(Hash, Nonce) achieves everlasting security
• A note on quantum related-key attacks
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• Frequency shift attack on ‘plug-and-play’ quantum key distribution systems
• Direct proof of security of Wegman-Carter authentication with partially known key
• Sifting attacks in finite-size quantum key distribution
• Quantum Key Recovery Attacks on 3-Round Feistel-2 Structure Without Quantum Encryption Oracles
• $$\text {Muckle}+$$: End-to-End Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchanges
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Trojan horse attack free fault-tolerant quantum key distribution protocols
• Detecting relay attacks on RFID communication systems using quantum bits
• Cryptanalysis and improvement of a quantum private set intersection protocol
• Quantum attacks on beyond-birthday-bound MACs
• Cascading attack on trusted-relay quantum key distribution networks

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