Direct proof of security of Wegman-Carter authentication with partially known key

DOI10.1007/S11128-013-0641-6MaRDI QIDQ479440zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. Abidin, Jan-Åke Larsson

Publication date 5 December 2014

Published in Quantum Information Processing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.0210

zbMATH Keywords

authenticationquantum key distributiontrace distancepartially known keystrongly universal hash functionsuniversal composability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Quantum state spaces, operational and probabilistic concepts (81P16) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)

Abstract: Information-theoretically secure (ITS) authentication is needed in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). In this paper, we study security of an ITS authentication scheme proposed by Wegman & Carter, in the case of partially known authentication key. This scheme uses a new authentication key in each authentication attempt, to select a hash function from an Almost Strongly Universal${}_2$ hash function family. The partial knowledge of the attacker is measured as the trace distance between the authentication key distribution and the uniform distribution; this is the usual measure in QKD. We provide direct proofs of security of the scheme, when using partially known key, first in the information-theoretic setting and then in terms of witness indistinguishability as used in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We find that if the authentication procedure has a failure probability $epsilon$ and the authentication key has an $epsilo{n}^{\prime }$ trace distance to the uniform, then under ITS, the adversary's success probability conditioned on an authentic message-tag pair is only bounded by $epsilon+|mT|epsilo{n}^{\prime }$, where $|mT|$ is the size of the set of tags. Furthermore, the trace distance between the authentication key distribution and the uniform increases to $|mT|epsilo{n}^{\prime }$ after having seen an authentic message-tag pair. Despite this, we are able to prove directly that the authenticated channel is indistinguishable from an (ideal) authentic channel (the desired functionality), except with probability less than $epsilon+epsilo{n}^{\prime }$. This proves that the scheme is ($epsilon+epsilo{n}^{\prime }$)-UC-secure, without using the composability theorem.

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Cited in

(4)

• Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication
• Quantum key distribution with PRF(Hash, Nonce) achieves everlasting security
• New security notions and feasibility results for authentication of quantum data
• An optimized quantum information splitting scheme with multiple controllers

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