Key recovery attacks on MACs based on properties of cryptographic APIs

DOI10.1007/3-540-45325-3_7MaRDI QIDQ4550256zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karl Brincat, Chris J. Mitchell

Publication date 2 December 2002

Published in Cryptography and Coding (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45325-3_7

zbMATH Keywords

chaining variablescryptanalysiscryptographic application program interfacesmessage authentication codes (MACs)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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Cited in

(4)

• Key-Recovery Attacks Against the MAC Algorithm Chaskey
• A modular treatment of cryptographic APIs: the symmetric-key case
• Key-Recovery Attacks on Universal Hash Function Based MAC Algorithms
• Unintended features of APIs: cryptanalysis of incremental HMAC

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