Key recovery and forgery attacks on the MacDES MAC algorithm

DOI10.1007/3-540-44598-6_11MaRDI QIDQ4536801zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Don Coppersmith, Lars R. Knudsen, Chris J. Mitchell

Publication date 28 July 2002

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44598-6_11

zbMATH Keywords

CBC-MACcryptanalysismessage authentication codes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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Cited in

(10)

• Key recovery attack on McNie based on low rank parity check codes and its reparation
• Key-Recovery Attacks Against the MAC Algorithm Chaskey
• On the security of two MAC algorithms
• New CBC-MAC forgery attacks
• Key-Recovery Attacks on Universal Hash Function Based MAC Algorithms
• Key recovery attacks on MACs based on properties of cryptographic APIs
• Almost universal forgery attacks on AES-based MAC's
• Another Look at Security Theorems for 1-Key Nested MACs
• New attacks against standardized MACs.
• On weak keys and forgery attacks against polynomial-based MAC schemes

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