Limiting user's Sybil attack in resource sharing

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_8MaRDI QIDQ4614061zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhou Chen, Qi Qi, Xiang Yan, Yu-kun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_8

zbMATH Keywords

resource sharing economic systemrobustness of market equilibriumSybil attack

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Internet topics (68M11) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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Cited in

(7)

• Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
• Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
• An improved incentive ratio of the resource sharing on cycles
• Study on agent incentives for resource sharing on P2P networks
• Informant: Detecting Sybils Using Incentives
• Agent incentives of strategic behavior in resource exchange
• Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks

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