An improved incentive ratio of the resource sharing on cycles

DOI10.1007/s40305-019-00242-3zbMath1438.90005OpenAlexW2923142034WikidataQ128177787 ScholiaQ128177787MaRDI QIDQ2326077

Zi-Xin Zhou, Yu-kun Cheng

Publication date: 4 October 2019

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-019-00242-3

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryresource sharingSybil attackincentive ratiomarket equilibrium mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Related Items (1)

Study on Agent Incentives for Resource Sharing on P2P Networks

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