Logicism, structuralism and objectivity.
This ambitious article argues for a version of mathematical structuralism that stops short of positing structures as platonic entities. Landry aligns her proposal with the semantic turn, in Coffa's sense, carried out by people like Frege and Carnap in opposition to Kant. The article continues by examining the question of how suitably clarified mathematical statements acquire their objective status. Landry argues that a focus on the structures involved in these statements is sufficient to ground their objective status. She concludes by clarifying the needed structures using category theory and contrasts this ``schematic approach to structuralism with the more familiar proposals of \textit{M. D. Resnik} [Noûs 15, No. 4, 529--55 (1981), see also Mathematics as a science of patterns. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1997; Zbl 0905.03004)] and \textit{S. Shapiro} [Philosophy of mathematics: structure and ontology. New York: Oxford University Press (1997; Zbl 0897.00004)].
- Ontological dependence and grounding for a weak mathematical structuralism
- An encoding approach to \textit{ante rem} structuralism
- Structure and categoricity: determinacy of reference and truth value in the philosophy of mathematics
- Mathematics and objectivity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1150559 (Why is no real title available?)
- Towards an institutional account of the objectivity, necessity, and atemporality of mathematics
- Generic structures
- Structuralist neologicism
- Inferentialism and structuralism: a tale of two theories
- Invariants and mathematical structuralism
- Carnap's structuralist thesis
- Curves in Gödel-space: towards a structuralist ontology of mathematical signs
- Structuralism and meta-mathematics
- The objectivity of mathematics
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