Lucky microseconds: a timing attack on Amazon's s2n implementation of TLS

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3_24MaRDI QIDQ2820499zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin R. Albrecht, Kenneth G. Paterson

Publication date 9 September 2016

Published in Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2016 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49890-3_24

zbMATH Keywords

CBC-mode encryptionLucky 13plaintext recoverys2ntiming attackTLS

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• Verifiable side-channel security of cryptographic implementations: constant-time MEE-CBC
• Faster and Timing-Attack Resistant AES-GCM
• Cache-timing template attacks
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• Fast elliptic curve cryptography in OpenSSL

Cited in

(8)

• Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE
• Partition oracles from weak key forgeries
• ACE in chains: how risky is CBC encryption of binary executable files?
• Verifiable side-channel security of cryptographic implementations: constant-time MEE-CBC
• Output-sensitive information flow analysis
• Output-sensitive information flow analysis
• Decrypting without keys: the case of the GlobalPlatform SCP02 protocol
• Securing unbounded differential privacy against timing attacks

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