Output-sensitive information flow analysis
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Recommendations
- Verifying constant-time implementations by abstract interpretation
- System-level non-interference of constant-time cryptography. II: Verified static analysis and stealth memory
- System-level non-interference of constant-time cryptography. I: Model
- Tempus fugit: How to plug it
- All Secrets Great and Small
Cites work
- Downgrading policies and relaxed noninterference
- Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2005
- Lucky microseconds: a timing attack on Amazon's s2n implementation of TLS
- On flow-sensitive security types
- Security types preserving compilation
- The program dependence graph and its use in optimization
- The security impact of a new cryptographic library
- Transforming out timing leaks
- Verifiable side-channel security of cryptographic implementations: constant-time MEE-CBC
- Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
- Verifying constant-time implementations by abstract interpretation
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