Manipulated electorates and information aggregation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ019MaRDI QIDQ5110012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Mehmet Ekmekci, Stephan Lauermann

Publication date 14 May 2020

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz019

zbMATH Keywords

election designinformation aggregationpolitical economyvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Coordination and turnout in large elections
• Large elections and interim turnout
• Information aggregation in Poisson elections
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?

Cited in

(12)

• How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
• When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
• Large elections and interim turnout
• Manufacturing Consent
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation
• Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
• Full information equivalence in large elections
• The political economy of zero-sum thinking
• Information aggregation under ambiguity: theory and experimental evidence
• Aggregation of antagonistic contingent preferences: when is it possible?
• Public information and electoral bias

This page was built for publication: Manipulated electorates and information aggregation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5110012)