Matching in networks: structure of the set of stable allocations

DOI10.1142/S0219198924500105MaRDI QIDQ6974342zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Alejandra Garces, Alejandro Neme, Eliana Pepa Risma

Publication date 6 June 2025

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198924500105

zbMATH Keywords

contractsmarket designmatchingnetworks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Market structure and matching with contracts
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners

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