Minimizing blocking agents for stable matching with partial approval information
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Cites work
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
- Nonlinear bipartite matching
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Robust and approximately stable marriages under partial information
- Size versus stability in the marriage problem
- Solving hard stable matching problems involving groups of similar agents
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
- Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
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