Modelling Attacker’s Knowledge for Cascade Cryptographic Protocols

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-87603-8_20MaRDI QIDQ3535379zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nazim Benassa

Publication date 11 November 2008

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00336641/file/ABZ2008benaissa.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cryptographyformal methodsmodel for attacker

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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Cites work

• Incremental parametric development of greedy algorithms
• Isabelle. A generic theorem prover
• On the security of public key protocols
• The B-Book

Cited in

(2)

• Proof-based design of security protocols
• Formalization in PVS of balancing properties necessary for proving security of the Dolev-Yao cascade protocol model

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