NETWORK DEPENDENCE OF STRONG RECIPROCITY

DOI10.1142/S0219525904000226MaRDI QIDQ5314327zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors R. Vilela Mendes

Publication date 5 September 2005

Published in Advances in Complex Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/nlin/0307003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Abstract: Experimental evidence suggests that human decisions involve a mixture of self-interest and internalized social norms which cannot be accounted for by the Nash equilibrium behavior of Homo Oeconomicus. This led to the notion of strong reciprocity (or altruistic punishment) to capture the human trait leading an individual to punish norm violators at a cost to himself. For a population with small autonomous groups with collective monitoring, the interplay of intra- and intergroup dynamics shows this to be an adaptive trait, although not fully invasive of a selfish population. However, the absence of collective monitoring in a larger society changes the evolution dynamics. Clustering seems to be the network parameter that controls maintenance and evolution of the reciprocator trait.

Cites work

• Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
• On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
• Preference evolution and reciprocity
• Statistical mechanics of complex networks
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations

Cited in

(1)

• The quantum ultimatum game

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