Nonmonotonic consequence based on intuitionistic logic
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of analyzing the metatheoretical notion of nonmonotonic (n.m.) inference in purely theoretical terms. Recently, there has been a trend towards defining Nonmonotonic Logic as a set of meta-rules reflecting how we may chose knowledge extensions. The working hypothesis in this paper is that the conditions governing these choices are best expressed and studied within the context of First Order Modal Intuitionistic Logic, where the basic modal sentence ``\(A>B\) is interpreted as meaning ``\(B\) represents an optimum choice with respect to \(A\) or ``it is appropriate to select \(B\) in the light of evidence \(A\). Hence, the main thesis is that the logical status of n.m. deduction can be understood in terms of a strong analogy with monotonic deduction: just as deductive logic rests upon a relation of implication, n.m. logic should rest upon a n.m. concept of implication, i.e. the relation \(>\). The author considers several axiomatic systems (the first of which is due to D. Gabbay), codifying the different intuitions we have about the above modal concept. The advantages of working in First Order Logic soon become apparent: completeness with respect to intuitive possible worlds semantics is obtained, counterexamples for invalidities are easily constructed, standard proof procedures are made available and a decidability result is proven. Moreover, the use of Intuitionistic Logic gives the systems additional expressive power, i.e. it is possible to incorporate the idea that an optimum choice may turn out to be wrong and also it allows for a description of the interplay between appropriate choices and incoming information. On the conceptual level, representing a metalogical relation as a logical one provides a unifying perspective within which it is possible to capture different types of n.m. inferences, e.g. ``reasoning about closure and ``prototypicality.
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