Note on the Intuitionistic Logic of False Belief

DOI10.18778/0138-0680.2021.20MaRDI QIDQ6162078zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tomasz Witczak

Publication date 15 June 2023

Published in Bulletin of the Section of Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.08309

zbMATH Keywords

intuitionistic modal logicneighborhood semanticsnon-normal modal logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10) Subsystems of classical logic (including intuitionistic logic) (03B20) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)

Abstract: In this paper we analyse logic of false belief in intuitionistic setting. This logic, studied in its classical version by Steinsvold, Fan, Gilbert and Venturi, describes the following situation: a formula F is not satisfied in a given world, but we still believe in it (or we think that it should be accepted). Another interpretations are also possible: e.g. that we do not accept F but it is imposed on us by a kind of council or advisory board. From the mathematical point of view, the idea is expressed by an adequate form of modal operator W which is interpreted in relational frames with neighborhoods. We discuss monotonicity of forcing, soundness, completeness and several other issues. We present also some simple systems in which confirmation of previously accepted formula is modelled.

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Cites work

• Being wrong: logics for false belief
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6868325 (Why is no real title available?)
• Intuitionistic non-normal modal logics: a general framework

Cited in

(8)

• Unknown truths and false beliefs: completeness and expressivity results for the neighborhood semantics
• A Grim semantics for logics of belief
• On truth-gaps, bipolar belief and the assertability of vague propositions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6131416 (Why is no real title available?)
• Intuitionistic Logics of Confirmation and Discouragement
• Being wrong: logics for false belief
• A uniform approach to axiomatizing bundled operators
• Logics of false belief and reliable belief

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