Observability analysis: Detecting when improved cryptosystems fail

DOI10.1007/3-540-45760-7_2MaRDI QIDQ4472061zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marc Joye, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Sung-Ming Yen, Moti Yung

Publication date 3 August 2004

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/2271/22710017.htm

zbMATH Keywords

cryptanalysiscryptosystemsfault analysisimplementationsobservabilityrobustnesssecurity analysisside-channel attacks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(4)

• Who watches the watchmen?: Utilizing performance monitors for compromising keys of RSA on intel platforms
• Fault Analysis Study of IDEA
• DEFAULT: cipher level resistance against differential fault attack
• Complete reverse-engineering of AES-like block ciphers by SCARE and FIRE attacks

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