On consistent solutions for strategic games
The authors introduce the class of ``personalized Nash equilibria (\textbf{P}-NE) which provides a unified approach for various kind of approximate Nash equilibria solutions. This is done by introducing a personalized choice rule \(p\) for all the potential players and substituting a conveniently defined characterizations for one person rationality (OPR) by (\textbf{P}-OPR). It is also proved that (\textbf{P}-NE) contains all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency. See also the article by \textit{B. Peleg, J. Potters}, and \textit{S. Tijs} [Econ. Theory 7, 81--93 (1996; Zbl 0840.90138)].
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