Optimal Dissent in Organizations

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00544.XMaRDI QIDQ3394007zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Augustin Landier, David Sraer, David Thesmar

Publication date 28 August 2009

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-937X.2009.00544.X

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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(6)

• Bargaining over bets
• Public communication with externalities
• The good, the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations
• Justifying Dissent
• Procedurally fair co-determination with endogeneous value uncertainty: an experiment
• Information transmission and countervailing biases in organizations

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