Optimal Execution with Identity Optionality
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Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of anonymous trading on the agents' strategy in an optimal execution framework. It mainly explores the specificity of order attribution on the Toronto Stock Exchange, where brokers can choose to either trade with their own identity or under a generic anonymous code that is common to all the brokers. We formulate a stochastic differential game for the optimal execution problem of a population of brokers and incorporate permanent and temporary price impacts for both the identity-revealed and anonymous trading processes. We then formulate the limiting mean-field game of controls with common noise and obtain a solution in closed-form via the probabilistic approach for the Almgren-Chris price impact framework. Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis to explore the impact of the model parameters on the optimal strategy.
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Cites work
- A probabilistic weak formulation of mean field games and applications
- Algorithmic and high-frequency trading
- Convex analysis for LQG systems with applications to major-minor LQG mean-field game systems
- Incorporating order-flow into optimal execution
- Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop McKean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle
- Mean field game of controls and an application to trade crowding
- Mean field games
- Mean field games. I: The stationary case
- Mean field games. II: Finite horizon and optimal control
- No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact
- Probabilistic theory of mean field games with applications I. Mean field FBSDEs, control, and games
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