Optimal rules for patent races

DOI10.1111/J.1468-2354.2011.00670.XMaRDI QIDQ4619973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kenneth L. Judd, Karl Schmedders, Şevin Yeltekin

Publication date 7 February 2019

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/60863/4/Judd_et_al_Optimal_rules_for_patient_races.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

innovation benefitsmultistage innovation racespatent race rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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• Cash breeds success: the role of financing constraints in patent races
• Shared patent rights and technological progress
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• Stationary Bayesian-Markov equilibria in Bayesian stochastic games with periodic revelation

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