Optimizing referral reward programs under impression management considerations

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2011.05.042MaRDI QIDQ420900zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ping Xiao, Christopher S. Tang, Jochen Wirtz

Publication date 23 May 2012

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.05.042

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg gameimpression managementreferral reward programs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cites work

• Salesforce incentives, market information, and production/inventory planning

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal promotional mix and pricing when faced with uncertain product value
• Design of an optimal frequency reward program in the face of competition
• Managing the reputation of an award to motivate performance
• Designing a referral reward program in freemium: the role of network externalities
• `Buy \(n\) times, get one free' loyalty cards: are they profitable for competing firms? A game theoretic analysis
• A fast approach to compute fuzzy values of matrix games with payoffs of triangular fuzzy numbers

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