Design of an optimal frequency reward program in the face of competition
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Publication:4614072
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_16zbMATH Open1405.91371OpenAlexW2607115465MaRDI QIDQ4614072FDOQ4614072
Authors: Arpit Goel, Nolan Skochdopole 
Publication date: 30 January 2019
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_16
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- Can restrictions on redemption timing boost profitability of loyalty programs in competitive environments?
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- <scp>Customer‐centric</scp> category selection for mobile and print promotions in loyalty reward programs
- `Buy \(n\) times, get one free' loyalty cards: are they profitable for competing firms? A game theoretic analysis
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