Paraconsistent reasoning as an analytic tool
The authors investigate the formalization of reasoning in the sense of measuring and evaluating the amount of information in an inconsistent set of data. To this extent their nonclassical logic might find use in certain decision-making processes. This goal is no simple one, since in any ordinary logic, classical logical operations yield any result one wishes; thus, logic is being examined by the authors in some dialectic sense, which is not always entirely clear. Their paraconsistent logics do not allow use of certain kinds of deduction (e.g., ex falso quodlibet) just as intuitionism does not allow use of the law of excluded middle and constructive logics require the constructive existence of objects and not the non-constructive existence of objects.
- Paraconsistent informational logic
- Is there a zande logic?
- Generalized truth values.: A reply to Dubois
- Uncertainty treatment using paraconsistent logic. Introducing paraconsistent artificial neural networks.
- The inapplicability of (selected) paraconsistent logics
- Truth and knowledge
- The paradox of inference and the non-triviality of analytic information
- The psychological aspects of paraconsistency
- `As if' reasoning in Vaihinger and Pasch
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