Pooling Agents for Customer-Intensive Services

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2022.2259MaRDI QIDQ6155022zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zhongbin Wang, Luyi Yang, Shiliang Cui, Yongpin Zhou

Publication date 13 March 2024

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/OPRE.2022.2259

zbMATH Keywords

agent payoffcustomer satisfactionpay-for-performancepoolingquality-speed tradeoffstrategic server

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Recommendations

• Incentive effects favor nonconsolidating queues in a service system: The principal-agent perspective
• Pooling queues with strategic servers: the effects of customer ownership
• Quality–Speed Conundrum: Trade-offs in Customer-Intensive Services
• The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency
• To incentivize the fast server or not? Firm's dilemma when queue signals service rate in high-contact services

Cited in

(6)

• Psychological heterogeneity in a queue: the impact of loss aversion on service pricing
• The optimal decision of service provider considering extra waiting area value-added services -- pooled or dedicated?
• Omnichannel services in the presence of customers' valuation uncertainty
• Optimizing customer satisfaction in a finite service time queueing system with incentive-based queueing length for service rates
• Optimal maintenance and pricing strategy for online service providers: a Stackelberg queueing game approach
• Queueing management for reducing the overlaps of customers in service systems

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