Price coherence and excessive intermediation

DOI10.1093/QJE/QJV018MaRDI QIDQ4963041zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Benjamin L. Edelman, Julian Wright

Publication date 6 November 2018

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv018

zbMATH Keywords

buyersintermediationretail pricesseller competion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(8)

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• Entry-deterring agency
• Price competition in the presence of a web aggregator
• Merchant internalization revisited
• Intermediation by heterogeneous oligopolists
• Mechanisms of cooperation between airlines and online travel agencies for flight crowdfunding
• Price parity clauses and platform data acquisition
• Estimating the value of information in the UK mortgage market

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