Joint-purchase benefits as an anti-steering device of platforms

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110504MaRDI QIDQ2158378zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susumu Sato

Publication date 26 July 2022

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110504

zbMATH Keywords

anti-steeringexcessive investmentjoint-purchase benefitsplatform merger

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Should vertically integrated platforms be mandated to share information with their rivals?
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Cites work

• Price coherence and excessive intermediation
• The agency model and MFN clauses

Cited in

(2)

• Competitor referral by platforms
• Platform acquisitions and Nash bargaining

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