Provability in principle and controversial constructivistic principles

DOI10.1023/A:1017954806119MaRDI QIDQ1372941zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Publication date 23 March 1998

Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1017954806119

Church's Thesis Epistemic Arithmetic epistemic principles Heyting arithmetic intuitionistic principles Markov's Principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Metamathematics of constructive systems (03F50) Intuitionistic mathematics (03F55)

Review text

New classical epistemic principles are formulated in the language of Shapiro's system of Epistemic Arithmetic. It is argued that some intrinsic plausibility can be attributed to these principles. Subsequently, the relations between these principles and variants of controversial constructivistic principles are investigated. The result of adding these new epistemic principles to Shapiro's system of Epistemic Arithmetic yields systems which are still conservative over Heyting arithmetic (under Gödel's translation). But at the same time these principles make certain relations between (translations of) controversial intuitionistic principles provable which are in their absence unprovable. For instance, in the context of one such principle, the intuitionistic version of Church's Thesis implies Markov's Principle.

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