Public Key Perturbation of Randomized RSA Implementations
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Recommendations
- Perturbating RSA Public Keys: An Improved Attack
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Cited in
(13)- On the use of RSA public exponent to improve implementation efficiency and side-channel resistance
- Attacking randomized exponentiations using unsupervised learning
- Correlation analysis against protected SFM implementations of RSA
- How to Fix Two RSA-Based PVSS Schemes—Exploration and Solution
- Exponent blinding does not always lift (partial) spa resistance to higher-level security
- Fault Attacks on RSA Public Keys: Left-To-Right Implementations Are Also Vulnerable
- Securing RSA against Fault Analysis by Double Addition Chain Exponentiation
- A modification of the RSA public-key encryption procedure (Corresp.)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1107699 (Why is no real title available?)
- Errors Matter: Breaking RSA-Based PIN Encryption with Thirty Ciphertext Validity Queries
- Making RSA–PSS Provably Secure against Non-random Faults
- On double exponentiation for securing RSA against fault analysis
- Perturbating RSA Public Keys: An Improved Attack
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