Making RSA–PSS Provably Secure against Non-random Faults

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_12MaRDI QIDQ5265081zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gilles Barthe, François Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benjamin Grégoire, Mehdi Tibouchi, Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz

Publication date 21 July 2015

Published in Advanced Information Systems Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_12

zbMATH Keywords

EasyCryptfault attacksformal verificationinfective countermeasurePSSRSA-CRT

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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(7)

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• On the distribution of low Hamming weight products
• How to Fix Two RSA-Based PVSS Schemes—Exploration and Solution
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• On the Provable Security of an Efficient RSA-Based Pseudorandom Generator

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