Making RSA–PSS Provably Secure against Non-random Faults
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Publication:5265081
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_12zbMATH Open1375.94098OpenAlexW57082118MaRDI QIDQ5265081FDOQ5265081
Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz, François Dupressoir, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Benjamin Grégoire, Gilles Barthe, Mehdi Tibouchi
Publication date: 21 July 2015
Published in: Advanced Information Systems Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_12
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- Security of hedged Fiat-Shamir signatures under fault attacks
- Public Key Perturbation of Randomized RSA Implementations
- Errors Matter: Breaking RSA-Based PIN Encryption with Thirty Ciphertext Validity Queries
- PSS is secure against random fault attacks
- On the distribution of low Hamming weight products
- How to Fix Two RSA-Based PVSS Schemes—Exploration and Solution
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