Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment

DOI10.1007/S100580100058MaRDI QIDQ1601997zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini, Andres Velasco

Publication date 4 September 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100058

zbMATH Keywords

time inconsistencydistortionary taxthird best

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(11)

• Time-Consistent Public Policy
• The time-inconsistency problem of labor taxes and constitutional constraints
• On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games
• Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable
• Ramsey fiscal policy and endogenous growth
• Time-consistent control in nonlinear models
• Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment
• Fiscal policy under loose commitment
• Optimal taxes without commitment
• In praise of wasteful spending
• Intertemporal distortions in the second best

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