Quality control strategy in supply chain under asymmetric information

DOI10.1504/IJOR.2009.021620MaRDI QIDQ1001930zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Cuihua Zhang, Haibin Yu, Xiaoyuan Huang

Publication date 20 February 2009

Published in International Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1504/IJOR.2009.021620

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbuyer quality controlmaximal principleoptimal controlprincipal agent modelsquality evaluationquality preventionSCMsupplier quality controlsupply chain collaborationsupply chain managementtransfer payment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

Summary: This paper is essentially concerned with the supplier and the buyer's quality control decision in supply chain with asymmetric information. The paper presents principal-agent models regarding the buyer's quality evaluation level and the supplier's quality prevention level decision problems. The paper then focuses on the supplier and the buyer's optimisation problems being turned into optimal control problems under asymmetric information. Maximal principle is used to get the solution. And comparison analyses are made between two different information settings. At last, numerical examples are presented to prove our models and analyses.

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• Supplier-customer interaction in quality control
• Optimal control of a quality supervision profit model for the electronic intermediary
• Analysis of operation decision in a supply chain based on asymmetrical quality risk
• Supply chain quality control strategy under the condition of moral hazard

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