On background: using two-argument chance

DOI10.1007/S11229-007-9271-9zbMATH Open1168.03307OpenAlexW1996367386MaRDI QIDQ1024146FDOQ1024146

Authors: Kevin Nelson 

Publication date: 16 June 2009

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9271-9

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zbMATH Keywords

conditional probabilityobjective Bayesianismprincipal principledirect inference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Cites Work

• Statistical Evidence
• What conditional probability could not be
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Subjective Probability
• Against conditionalization
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Conditionalizing on Knowledge
• Who's afraid of undermining? Why the principal principle might not contradict Humean supervenience
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle

Cited In (3)

• Chance in the world. A humean guide to objective chance
• Models of objective chance: an analysis through examples
• Chance, resiliency, and Humean supervenience

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