A non-dictatorial compromise

DOI10.1007/BF00435495MaRDI QIDQ1102157zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Murat R. Sertel

Publication date 1988

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435495

zbMATH Keywords

modeaxiomsapproval votingaggregation of choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930664 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Comparison and choice
• Computations in choice groupoids
• On the routewise application of choice
• Synopses in the Theory of Choice

Cited in

(6)

• Explorations in aggregating choices
• Characterizing approval voting
• A `divide and choose' approach to compromising
• Moderation of an ideological party
• Manipulability of choice aggregations
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting

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