A non-dictatorial compromise

DOI10.1007/BF00435495zbMATH Open0643.90004MaRDI QIDQ1102157FDOQ1102157

Authors: Murat R. Sertel 

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

modeaxiomsapproval votingaggregation of choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Comparison and choice
• On the routewise application of choice
• Synopses in the Theory of Choice
• Computations in choice groupoids

Cited In (6)

• Explorations in aggregating choices
• Characterizing approval voting
• A `divide and choose' approach to compromising
• Moderation of an ideological party
• Manipulability of choice aggregations
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting

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