Active systems with monotone dependent criteria of the center and the elements under conditions of uncertainty

MaRDI QIDQ1102233zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors A. A. Prokopenko

Publication date 1987

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

absolute optimalityattainment of targetsmonotone dependent incentive systemopen managementoptimal planningtruthful reporting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Optimality conditions (49K99) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Review text

We introduce the notion of monotone dependent incentive system, extending the definition of monotone dependence of functions, and investigate the properties of organization mechanisms that include such incentive systems. For systems with open management and optimal planning procedures, we establish conditions that ensure absolute optimality of the organization mechanisms, truthful reporting, and attainment of targets by the active elements.

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Cited in

(1)

• Optimality of the principle of fair play management. Necessary and sufficient conditions for reliability of information in active systems

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