Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play
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Publication:1129177
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00103-6zbMath0905.90188MaRDI QIDQ1129177
Publication date: 13 August 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00103-6
Related Items
EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS, Affine Relaxations of the Best Response Algorithm: Global Convergence in Ratio-Bounded Games, Stochastic mean values, rational expectations, and price movements, LEARNING TO FACE STOCHASTIC DEMAND
Cites Work
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- The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play
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- An iterative method of solving a game
- Krasnoselski-Mann Iterations in Normed Spaces
- The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- A Theorem on Mean-Value Iterations
- Mean Value Methods in Iteration
- Set-valued analysis
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