Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00103-6zbMath0905.90188MaRDI QIDQ1129177

Sjur Didrik Flåm

Publication date: 13 August 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00103-6

zbMATH Keywords

learning; noncooperative games; mean-value iterates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B50: General equilibrium theory

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS, Affine Relaxations of the Best Response Algorithm: Global Convergence in Ratio-Bounded Games, Stochastic mean values, rational expectations, and price movements, LEARNING TO FACE STOCHASTIC DEMAND

Cites Work

• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Iterative computation of Cournot equilibrium
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Krasnoselski-Mann Iterations in Normed Spaces
• The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• A Theorem on Mean-Value Iterations
• Mean Value Methods in Iteration
• Set-valued analysis
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