Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments
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Publication:1167070
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90003-8zbMath0489.90089OpenAlexW1994518527MaRDI QIDQ1167070
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90003-8
stabilitykernelbargaining setB1- bargaining setB2-bargaining setformation of surplus coalitionsgovernment portfolio distributionparliamentary situationvoting games with side payments
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Smooth social choice ⋮ Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining ⋮ The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
Cites Work
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- When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games
- Generalised bargaining sets for cooperative games
- A Method for Computing the Kernel of n-Person Games
- Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}