Dummett's intuitionism is not strict finitism

DOI10.1007/BF00500035MaRDI QIDQ1187232zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Samuel William Mitchell

Publication date 28 June 1992

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00500035

zbMATH Keywords

intuitionismstrict finitism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Intuitionistic mathematics (03F55)

Review text

Michael Dummett has argued against the use of classical logic in mathematical proofs and the concomitant realist philosophy of mathematics, insisting that mathematical statements should admit some kind of ``test of comprehension. It has been said that a similar argument might be brought forward against the intuitionistic position itself by a so-called finitist mathematician. The author explains why he thinks that such an argument would not be valid. Dummett's own answer to the finitist objection does not satisfy him. He claims that the finitist position is inconsistent, and that (Dummett's) intuitionistic position is sound.

Recommendations

• Dummett's anti-realist defense of mathematical intuitionism
• Classical arithmetic is part of intuitionistic arithmetic
• Dummett's case for intuitionism
• The conveyability of intuitionism, an essay on mathematical cognition
• Dummett, Brouwer and the metaphysics of mathematics

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3873291 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3557754 (Why is no real title available?)
• The conveyability of intuitionism, an essay on mathematical cognition

Cited in

(7)

• Dummett on impredicativity
• Classical arithmetic is part of intuitionistic arithmetic
• Dummett, Brouwer and the metaphysics of mathematics
• Sublunary intuitionism
• Dummett's anti-realist defense of mathematical intuitionism
• Some obstacles facing a semantic foundation for constructive mathematics
• Epistemic Optimism

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