Two views of belief: Belief as generalized probability and belief as evidence

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Publication:1193475

DOI10.1016/0004-3702(92)90048-3zbMath0762.68055OpenAlexW2164296059WikidataQ29396565 ScholiaQ29396565MaRDI QIDQ1193475

Joseph Y. Halpern, Ronald Fagin

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(92)90048-3



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