Moral hazard, externalities, and compensation for crop damages from wildlife

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1996.0050MaRDI QIDQ1267686zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kimberly Rollins, Hugh C. III Briggs

Publication date 8 December 1998

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee330f895907a627ffa842702d55bcbd3df7df6a

zbMATH Keywords

principal-multiple agent modelpublic good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cited in

(2)

• Habitat conservation, wildlife extraction and agricultural expansion.
• Compensation for wildlife damages: Habitat conversion, species preservation and local welfare

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