Investment coordination and demand complementarities

DOI10.1007/S001990050267MaRDI QIDQ1285902zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-Marie Baland, Patrick Francois

Publication date 10 June 1999

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273344/files/qed_wp_933.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

big pushcoordination failuresdemand complementarity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multisectoral models in economics (91B66)

Recommendations

• Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
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(5)

• Complementarities and costly investment in a growth model
• Spoiling synergy
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• Banks with market power, sectoral structure and the big push
• Innovation frequency of durable complementary goods

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