Is The theory of everything merely the ultimate ensemble theory?

DOI10.1006/APHY.1998.5855zbMATH Open1057.81505arXivgr-qc/9704009OpenAlexW3125256726WikidataQ55887197 ScholiaQ55887197MaRDI QIDQ1290432FDOQ1290432

Max Tegmark

Publication date: 28 June 1999

Published in: Annals of Physics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We discuss some physical consequences of what might be called ``the ultimate ensemble theory, where not only worlds corresponding to say different sets of initial data or different physical constants are considered equally real, but also worlds ruled by altogether different equations. The only postulate in this theory is that all structures that exist mathematically exist also physically, by which we mean that in those complex enough to contain self-aware substructures (SASs), these SASs will subjectively perceive themselves as existing in a physically ``real world. We find that it is far from clear that this simple theory, which has no free parameters whatsoever, is observationally ruled out. The predictions of the theory take the form of probability distributions for the outcome of experiments, which makes it testable. In addition, it may be possible to rule it out by comparing its a priori predictions for the observable attributes of nature (the particle masses, the dimensionality of spacetime, etc) with what is observed.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9704009

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General and philosophical questions in quantum theory (81P05)

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