Economic growth and decline with endogenous property rights

DOI10.1023/A:1009749908420zbMATH Open0927.91022OpenAlexW4251181396MaRDI QIDQ1291938FDOQ1291938

Authors: Aaron Tornell 

Publication date: 10 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Growth (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009749908420

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zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesneoclassical growth modelMarkov perfect equilibriainstitutional changeswitching equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cited In (13)

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